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  A concern for equity has long been an important aspect of economic analysis.   Adam 
Smith himself speaks harshly of the costs of poverty, claiming “No society can surely be 
flourishing and happy, of which the greater part of the members are poor and miserable.  It is 
but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should 
have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, 
cloathed, and lodged” (Smith, 1976 reprint, Book I, chapter 8, page 88).   Most policy 
analysis done by economists, however, has focused on efficiency rather than equity, dealing 
with such issues as the cost of government regulations, the deadweight loss of taxation, or the 
labor supply effects of government transfers.   
Most economists take for granted the idea that equity and efficiency cannot be 
achieved together – that greater equity must come at the inevitable cost of a loss of efficiency.  
In this lecture I explore this efficiency/equity tradeoff.  I am particularly interested in 
identifying those circumstances under which equity and efficiency may not trade off against 
each other.  I want to identify policy situations that promote greater equity but have little 
effect on efficiency or – even better – policy situations where equity and efficiency 
complement each other and where government transfers from richer to poorer individuals may 
perhaps even produce an more efficient society than would occur in the absence of those 
transfers.   
 
I.  The Case for a Trade-off 
The best-known discussion of the tradeoffs between equity and efficiency is in the 
much-read book by economist Arthur Okun, Equity and Efficiency:  The Big Tradeoff, 
published in the late 1970s.  This book has been highly influential.  It is the Brookings   4
Institution’s best-selling volume ever, and continues to be used in undergraduate economics 
classes throughout the U.S.  Okun declares “…the conflict between equality and economic 
efficiency is inescapable” (Okun, 1975, p120).   He describes his famous “leaky bucket 
experiment” in which he asserts that any dollar transferred from a richer individual to a poorer 
individual, will result in less than a dollar increase in income for the recipient.   
Okun identifies four reasons for leaky buckets:  Administrative costs of redistribution, 
changes in work effort induced by redistribution, changes in savings and investment behavior 
induced by redistribution, and changes in attitudes (for instance, motivation to acquire human 
capital) induced by redistribution.  The result is that government efforts to achieve equity 
inevitably result in a smaller level of total income and less efficient use of resources.  The 
policy question becomes how much leakage a society is willing to accept in order to achieve a 
certain level of equity.  Surprisingly, Okun spends no time discussing how one might 
minimize the leaks in the bucket, the topic of this lecture. 
There is substantial empirical evidence that suggests government transfers, designed to 
create greater equity, can lead to inefficiencies.  For instance, in the 1970s the U.S. funded a 
series of experiments to test the effects of welfare program design on labor supply and well-
being of recipients, known as the negative income tax experiments.
1  Summarizing the results, 
Burtless (1986) notes that in general the government had to spend almost $2 in order to 
increase family incomes by $1 – a leaky bucket that lost half of its contents in the process of 
transfers.  Most of this was due to the fact that higher transfers induced reductions in labor 
supply. 
                                                           
1 The two parameters most of these experiments focused on were cash guarantee levels to nonworkers and the 
benefit reduction rate, that is, the rate at which benefits were reduced as a recipient went to work and received 
earnings.   5
In another well-known example, economists have attempted to measure the 
inefficiency costs of unemployment insurance (UI).  Designed to raise incomes among the 
unemployed, UI also increases the length of unemployment spells and hence reduces 
earnings.  Katz and Meyer (1990) estimate that each additional week of benefit availability 
increases the duration of unemployment spells among UI recipients by 0.16 to 0.20 weeks.  A 
wide variety of other examples can be cited, from the research that suggests social security 
transfers reduce savings and investment, to the research that argues disability insurance 
induces early retirement and a higher share of reported injuries. 
No economist will deny the presence of many leaky buckets and inefficiencies in the 
operation of government tax and transfer programs.  My question for today is whether 
government efforts to produce greater equity must inevitably produce greater inefficiency, or 
whether there are policies and circumstances in which equity-increasing transfers can occur 
without seriously reducing efficiency.  I suggest that there are three general circumstances in 
which this can occur.  Before turning to a discussion of these three situations, however, 
thinking about this question in the context of a simple conceptual framework is useful. 
 
II.  A Conceptual Framework 
My main goal in this section is to identify some of the key parameters that are likely to 
cause leaky buckets and which policy can affect.  To do this, I must make a substantial 
number of simplifying assumptions to clarify exactly what issues I am focusing on. 
To provide a starting definition:  I take efficiency to be related to the total economic 
resources available to a society.  A more efficient society can produce more with the same   6
amount of resources.
2   This leads me to focus this simple model solely on aggregate income, 
rather than on some larger measure of social utility or social welfare.  (At several points 
below I note where one could monetize certain non-income benefits or losses to extend this 
definition, if desired.)  Most policy discussions focus primarily on income losses or gains; to 
the extent that I am deeply interested in policy implications, looking only at income is 
reasonable.  
Let there be two groups in the population:  Taxpayers and benefit recipients.  The 
recipients are the “poor” to whom society wants to provide income supplements of some sort. 
Initially, let us assume a simple one period model, so there are no investment-related issues.  
In this one period, the rich and poor are fixed groups with no switching between them.
3   For 
simplicity, I am going to focus only on means-tested transfers, which go from the rich to the 
poor.
4  
One-period framework.   Table 1 provides an outline of the framework that I propose 
to think about equity and efficiency tradeoffs.  In the absence of any redistributive transfers, 
assume taxpayers have an aggregate income equal to Yt, while recipients have an aggregate 
income equal to Yr.  Each of these is dependent upon level of effort among taxpayers and 
recipients, et and er.  Hence, total income, Y, can be defined as  
(1) Y(et, er) = Yt(et) + Yr(er).    
In the presence of redistributive transfers, total income (Y*) is equal to the post-
transfer income of both taxpayers (Y*t) and recipients (Y*r).  Level of effort in the presence 
                                                           
2 Okun uses a similar definition. 
3 This is an important assumption and ignores the possibility of people positioning themselves in advance to be 
transfer recipients.    
4 This sets aside social insurance programs, which are broadly available throughout the population, but may have 
some redistributive aspects.   At least in the U.S., means tested programs generate more political controversy (in 
part because their benefits are not broadly shared) and are the programs where “leakage” and perverse behavioral 
responses raise the most public concern.      7
of redistributive transfers is denoted as e*t and e*r among taxpayers and recipients 
respectively. Hence, in a world with redistributive transfers 
(2) Y*(e*t,e*r) =  Y*t(e*t) + Y*r(e*r).   
Assume that the government seeks a total tax payment, T, from the taxpayers, in order 
to provide redistributive transfers.  I assume T is fixed, that is, the government taxes at a level 
necessary to produce total tax revenues of T.  If there is a behavioral response to these 
additional taxes (say, lower labor supply) there may be a further loss of income Lt(e*t-et) 
among taxpayers, where I assume this loss is a function of the difference in effort with and 
without redistributive taxation.
5    
I also allow for the possibility that taxpayers might gain from these transfers, denoted 
by G.  Since I am focusing on income changes, this gain must be some monetized measure of 
taxpayer gains.  For instance, this could be income gains due to reduced crime brought about 
by redistributive transfers (I give further examples below).  G could be fixed for a given level 
of T, or it could be a function of the income received by recipients, Y*r.  In this case, the 
gains to taxpayers are affected by inefficiencies caused by the transfer.    
Assume that the income received by taxpayers in the presence of redistributive 
transfers is a simple function of these variables, so   
(3) Y*t(e*t)  = Yt(et) – T – Lt(e*t – et) + G. 
Recipients of transfers are also likely to experience gains and losses relative to a world 
with no transfers.  Recipients receive benefits B in transfers, where I assume that B = T – C, 
where C is the administrative cost associated with making transfers.  Note that if a society has 
a tax system in place in order to support (non-redistributive) social needs, the marginal   8
administrative costs of redistributive taxation are likely to be small.  Assuming B = T – C is 
equivalent to assuming that tax money is spent on either transfer benefits among the poor or 
tax  administration, hence no taxpayers receive any direct benefits.
6   
These transfers may induce behavioral changes among recipients that cause an income 
loss of Lr(e*r–er).  As with taxpayers, this loss is a function of the difference in effort with and 
without transfers.  Hence, 
(4) Y*r(e*r) = Yr(er) + B – Lr(e*r–er). 
A comparison of the efficiency costs of redistributive taxation is a comparison 
between Y and Y*.   Y is greater than Y* (and transfers cause an efficiency loss) when 
(5) Yt + Yr > Y*t + Y*r   
Substituting terms, this is a question of whether 
(6)  T + Lt + Lr  > B + G 
Substituting for B, this can also be written 
  (6’)   Lt + Lr + C > G 
First, assume G is small or zero.  It should be immediately obvious that if there are any 
induced income losses (Lt or Lr) as a result of redistributive transfers, there will be an 
efficiency loss.   Only if the induced income losses (Lt and Lr) are zero and if administrative 
costs C are minimal is there no leaky bucket.  In this world, a dollar from the rich is directly 
transferred as a dollar received by the poor (T = B) and transfers are costless.  The transfer 
scheme simply rearranges who holds the income.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5  Because I am focusing only on income as an outcome, I do not allow for any offsetting gains to taxpayers due 
to the change in their leisure time.  One could monetize this so that the induced income losses included in the 
model are net of any leisure gains. 
6  Questions about leakages in the targeting of transfers are interesting, but not the focus of this paper.   9
Because I want to assume that costless income redistribution is desirable, I will 
assume that G > 0.   That is to say, in the absence of efficiency losses and with small 
administrative costs, I will assume that equity-enhancing transfers should be undertaken.  I 
make this assumption, without specifying exactly what the nature of these gains might be.
7  
This could occur because taxpayers are altruistic and value the income gains of the poor, so 
that better housing, education, and health among the poor add to the well-being of taxpayers.  
They may value equity or prefer a society in which nobody is poor or hungry.  As evidence 
for this effect, Alesina, et. al. (2001) indicate that there is a large, negative, and significant 
effect of social inquality on the level of happiness expressed by citizens of Europe.  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, this effect is not present in U. S. data.  There also may be externalities related 
to less poverty (such as lower crime) that directly benefit taxpayers.    
The framework laid out above makes clear what the factors are that determine the 
level of inefficiency loss induced by redistributive transfers.  There will be a lower efficiency 
cost to redistributive taxation the greater are the gains to taxpayers (G), the smaller are the 
administrative costs (C), and the smaller are induced losses to taxpayers and recipients (Lt and 
Lr).  As noted above, I assume G is positive but say nothing more about this variable.  I also 
largely ignore issues relating to administrative costs (C); if a tax system is necessary for other 
purposes, the marginal administrative cost of redistributive transfers is likely to be small.    
With perhaps less justification, I am also going to ignore induced income losses 
among taxpayers, largely because this is not my focus in this paper.  There is a substantial 
literature documenting the deadweight loss of taxation.  For instance, Ballard, et. al. (1985) 
                                                           
7  I also make no claims about the size of G.  Clearly, if G is large, even quite inefficient transfer policies will 
become worthwhile.  An alternative paper could explore how to make redistributive taxation more attractive by 
selecting policies that maximize the gains to taxpayers as a result of that taxation. For instance, certain types of   10
suggest that losses induced by the U.S. system were approximately $0.13 to $0.24 for every 
dollar raised.  In my framework, Lt is the additional deadweight loss due to redistributive 
transfers, that is, the marginal income loss associated with the additional taxes necessary to 
make redistributive transfers.  One might argue that Lt is small for two reasons:  First, if the 
number of taxpayers is large and the number of recipients is relatively small then the 
additional tax payment per taxpayer for redistributive taxation is small and hence the 
behavioral response of taxpayers to redistributive taxation is likely to be small.
8  In this 
situation, the behavioral response of recipients may dominate the loss calculation.  Second, 
we are discussing only the behavioral response of taxpayers induced by the marginal taxation 
focused on redistribution.  If the majority of government budgets go for non-redistributive 
purposes (defense, infrastructure, foreign aid, etc), then the additional behavioral response due 
to the marginal taxes that go to redistribution is likely to be a relatively small component of 
the overall deadweight loss caused by the taxation.  Not everyone will be convinced by these 
arguments
9, however, and in some nations levels of redistributive taxation may be quite high.  
Hence I recognize that Lt is almost surely greater than zero, but I take it as a fixed cost 
associated with redistribution and focus on other variables.
10 
This leaves the induced income losses among the recipients (Lr).  In sections III and 
IV, below, I suggest policy situations in which Lr is likely to be small and argue that these 
situations are likely to produce greater equity without major efficiency tradeoffs.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
transfers may produce greater taxpayer satisfaction.  This may be one reason for in-kind transfers programs 
focused on food, housing or medical care, rather than cash transfers. 
8 Of course, small per-person losses among a large population can add up to large total losses. 
9 For instance, see the recent article by Feldstein (1999), where he argues that the deadweight loss of increasing 
tax rates within the U.S. system is extremely high.  
10 One could, of course, discuss ways to design tax systems to minimize deadweight loss.  See the discussion of 
tax structure and efficiency in Auerbach and Hines (2001).   11
Two-period framework.  Limiting the discussion to one period prevents any discussion 
of the longer-term effects that might result from redistributive transfers.  In particular, many 
people argue that certain types of transfers should be considered investments, because they 
produce positive future effects.  This argument is most frequently made regarding transfers to 
poor children, where better health care, better nutrition or better schooling might result in 
lower future government costs and greater future employment and earnings among transfer 
recipients.   
To see how such investment effects might occur, let me think about what might 
happen if the one-period framework is expanded in the simplest possible way to allow for 
long-term effects.  Assume redistributive transfers occur only in the first period, but may have 
future effects.  Thus there may be a second period that is a substantial time into the future, 
perhaps as long as 5 to 15 years later.  I assume that one-period tax payments affect taxpayers 
only in the period in which they are paid, so that the calculation among taxpayers does not 
change. (One could easily allow for two periods of losses to taxpayers, if higher current taxes 
reduce labor supply or savings in future periods.  Similarly, one could easily allow for two 
periods of gains to taxpayers, if they value the income gains in the second period among 
recipients.  But since taxpayers are not at the center of my concern, I ignore these issues.)
 11 
Among recipients, assume that there is a change in behavior in the second period that 
is induced by first-period transfers.  Denote the second period income effect of this change in 
behavior I
2(B
1), where superscripts index period and I
2 is dependent upon the magnitude and 
the type of the first-period transfer, B
1.  I
2 will be positive if the transfer functions as an 
                                                           
11 I deal with multi-period models in which the transfer occurs only once.  A multi-period model in which 
transfers recur would open up a variety of other interesting issues.  For instance, people who are among the 
taxpayers in the starting period might be “at risk” of being a recipient in some future period.  This could create 
political support for a transfer program in a way not allowed in my model.    12
investment.   For instance, there may be a change in effort due to learned behavior induced by 
the transfer program (such as better money management or better job-search skills).  Or there 
may be a change in ability induced by the transfer program (perhaps due to greater education 
or training received in the first period.)    
The benefits that result from the transfer may now substantially exceed the direct cost 







1 (where δ is a discount factor).   
The calculation in equation (6), which determines whether redistributive transfers create an 
efficiency loss, is amended to 









The additional positive term on the right-hand side of the inequality makes it less likely to 
hold.  If the behavioral changes induced by the transfer are large and positive, redistributive 
taxation could actually raise total income.  In this case, the transfers can produce both greater 
equity and greater efficiency. 
  It is important to note that I
2, the second period income changes among recipients 
induced by first period transfers, need not be positive.  There has been a substantial U.S. 
policy discussion around the possibility that cash welfare transfers induce less work effort and 
greater fertility over time.
12  Both of these could lead to reduced future earnings and work 
effort.  So-called “welfare dependency” arguments claim that the long-term effects of 
redistributive transfers on behavior are negative.  While recognizing this possibility, my 
interest is in identifying policies where the long-term income effects of transfers are likely to 
be positive, that is, policies that function as investments.  In Section V, I discuss policy 
situations where transfers are likely to have long-term positive benefits. 
   13
III.  Case 1: A Lack of Recipient Agency 
  I am focusing on the costs associated with redistribution that occur because of 
behavioral responses to transfers on the part of recipients.  For instance, policymakers are 
concerned about reductions in labor supply caused by cash support for the poor, increases in 
non-marital childbearing caused by assistance to single mothers, or changes in the timing of 
retirement caused by public pension plans.   All of these examples reflect a concern about the 
size of Lr – the induced income losses among recipients that are generated by the transfer. 
If there is no individual agency, however, there can be little induced income loss.  If 
individuals have no control over their life outcomes or no capacity to respond, then the 
behavior changes among recipients that create leaky buckets for government transfers will not 
occur (i.e., Lr = 0).  
The most common lack of agency occurs in situations where an individual has no 
capacity for response.  This may be true of disabled individuals, of the elderly who can no 
longer work, or of children.  If these groups are not working and not expected to work, 
additional income will not cause an offsetting change in labor supply.  If these groups are not 
now saving, then additional income cannot cause a reduction in saving.  That is to say, 
because these individuals cannot act effectively, they would not behave in any less acceptable 
manner if provided with additional transfers.  They are poor because of circumstances outside 
their control and they have no ability to affect that poverty by their own behavior.
13 
An alternative reason for lack of agency may be institutional constraints that prevent 
individual effort from affecting outcomes.  For example, this might occur in a highly stratified 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 For instance, see Murray (1994). 
13 Blank (2000) indicates that a lack of agency may also affect the way in which government assistance can best 
be delivered.  Of course, if lack of agency is foreseeable in some earlier period, the presence of future expected 
transfers could cause behavioral changes.   14
society where one’s position is entirely determined by family background or race or ethnicity.  
If jobs, wages, and housing opportunities are limited by the color of one’s skin, one’s gender, 
or one’s ethnic background, then the level of effort exerted by these groups will not matter 
and income will be largely predetermined.  
In a paper focusing on the role of income mobility, Picketty (1995) develops a model 
that makes this point.  He has a simple scheme in which the expected income of an agent is 
equal to πk + θe, where e is effort and πk is the expectation of one’s future income based on 
family background k (for instance, k may signify parental race or parental income.)  If θ = 0, 
then one’s future income is entirely determined by one’s family background and there is no 
return to effort.  When effort no longer matters, then induced losses among transfer recipients 
are zero, since there is no incentive to behave differently when transfers are received (in the 
framework laid out in Section II, e*r = er and hence Lr equals zero.)   This suggests that 
transfers to individuals without agency are likely to generate few efficiency tradeoffs.   
What does this mean from a policy standpoint?  It suggests that transfers to those 
without agency may produce few leaky bucket effects.  This may explain why certain types of 
transfers are politically more acceptable than others.  Within the U.S., the distinction between 
the “deserving” and the “undeserving” poor is often based on whether poor individuals are 
viewed as behaving in ways that contribute to their poverty.  Those without agency are 
typically considered the more deserving.  Hence, U.S. transfer programs for the elderly or the 
disabled are more generous than for able-bodied. 
More perversely, this argument also suggests that if a society maintains strong limits 
on economic opportunity for a particular group, then it can better afford to transfer some 
assistance to this group.  Hence, those who are culpable in maintaining the institutional   15
structures that promote racial or ethnic exclusion can feel “good” about helping the poor, at a 
relatively low cost. 
  But the neo-Okuns in the audience will immediately find an objection to this 
discussion about agency.  Even transfers to individuals who have no personal agency may still 
have offsetting efficiency costs if they affect the behavior of other family members.  For 
instance, if supporting the poor elderly with public money induces fewer children to feel they 
must support their parents, there may be efficiency costs.  Or if guaranteeing college 
scholarships for children leads parents to work less and save less then there may be efficiency 
costs.  Although the empirical evidence on these effects is limited, Cox and Jakubson (1995) 
estimate that cash welfare payments have a small but measurable effect on interfamily private 
transfers.  Schoeni (1996) finds somewhat larger effects and also finds that public welfare 
transfers reduce the time given to help other family members. 
  In short, an individual must be both without agency and socially isolated in order for 
transfers to truly involve no efficiency losses.  What does this mean for policy?  This is an 
argument for providing orphans with higher degrees of government support than one provides 
other children.  Or for distinguishing in program generosity between elderly and disabled 
individuals who have no family versus those who do.   
Transfer policy tends not to make this distinction relating to social isolation very 
frequently.  I suspect this is because of the difficulty in determining who might have private 
family assistance available.  Not all families provide interfamily transfers and a policy that 
helped only childless widows would create difficulties for the elderly widow whose children 
refused to help.  If the policy was designed to help only childless widows or widows not 
helped by their families, this would create strong incentives for families to refuse assistance.   16
In short, among all poor individuals, society should be more willing to redistribute to 
those without agency of their own, who can neither escape their poverty nor behave 
differently if given additional income.  Society should be even more willing to redistribute to 
those without agency and without family.  In these circumstances, the efficiency costs of 
redistribution are limited to the pure administrative costs or the costs imposed on taxpayers 
and the efficiency arguments against redistribution are relatively weak.  
 
IV.  Case 2:  Policies that Impose Behavioral Requirements 
  In Case 1, it is a lack of responsiveness on the part of recipients that limits the 
inefficiency of transfers.  In this example, I discuss a situation where it is the nature of the 
transfer program that limits inefficiency.  
  In more recent years, a variety of government programs have begun to combine 
income transfers with behavioral requirements.  The most discussed example of this may be 
welfare-to-work programs, which provide assistance to poor families but demand that they 
participate in job search and job placement programs.  Other examples include services to 
teens that are conditional upon staying in school; enforcement of job search requirements in 
unemployment insurance programs; or work assistance programs for unemployed males that 
are conditional upon staying off drugs and out of trouble with the law.  These programs have 
the potential to substantially reduce the inefficiencies that may be associated with a transfer, 
because they condition the transfer upon a behavioral response that reduces the costs.
14    
An excellent example of this type of transfer can be observed in some of the welfare-
to-work programs that have been run experimentally in the United States and Canada.  Known 
                                                           
14 In a somewhat different context, this point was made by Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982), who argue that 
constraining transfers can help target them on the neediest population.   17
as “financial incentive programs” these policies provide significant cash support to families, 
but condition the cash payments on work behavior.  Hence, these programs subsidize family 
income but also encourage labor supply.
15  Because of their particularly strong results, let me 
describe two of these programs in a bit more detail.   
The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) was implemented in Minnesota in 
1994 and aimed at moving women on welfare into employment.  MFIP provided a high 
earnings disregard that allowed women to continue to receive some cash assistance as they 
went to work, until their earnings were about 140 percent of the poverty line.
16  At the same 
time, participants were also required to take part in mandatory job search and job placement 
programs.  Participants were randomly assigned to the MFIP program, so that a control group 
of women continued to take part in more traditional welfare programs.   The random 
assignment methodology resulted in an evaluation of MFIP that is considered highly credible. 
  The Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) was implemented in 1992 in two provinces in 
Canada (New Brunswick and British Columbia.)
17  It offered a randomly chosen group of 
women on welfare (known as Income Assistance in Canada) an alternative:  If they agreed to 
leave welfare, they could receive an earnings supplement in every month when they worked 
30 hours per week or more.  The supplement was large and roughly doubled the earnings of 
most participants.  It was calculated as half the difference between a participant’s earnings 
and an “earnings benchmark” set at $30,000 in New Brunswick and $37,000 in British 
Columbia (Canadian dollars).  The supplement was reduced by 50 cents for every dollar of 
earnings.  In this program, the 30-hour rule provided the work mandate; women working less 
                                                           
15 For a more detailed discussion of these programs, see Blank, et. al. (2000) or Michalopoulos and Berlin 
(2001).   18
than this could not collect a supplement.  As in MFIP, participants were randomly assigned to 
the SSP program or the traditional welfare program in the province, and the results of the 
evaluation are considered highly credible.
18 
  The impact of these two programs is shown in Table 2, which shows the gains among 
program recipients versus the treatment group for both of these experimental programs.  
Employment increased by 7.2 percent among SSP recipients and by 11.5 percent among 
MFIP recipients, relative to the treatment group.  Earnings increases were significant, as were 
increases in annual income.  In both experiments, poverty declined as well by a substantial 
amount.  Because these programs continued to provide generous earnings supplements to 
workers, they also cost the government more money.  But the increased costs were more than 
offset by the income gains.   
In SSP, for every dollar spent by the government in transfers, recipients gained $1.95 
in income.  In MFIP, for every dollar in transfer income, recipients gained $2.48.
19  These are 
markedly different results than the negative income tax results cited above (Burtless, 1986), 
where a dollar in government expenditures resulted in only a $0.53 gain in recipient incomes. 
  It is worth noting that the generous working family tax credits enacted in the U.S. and 
in Great Britain in recent years can be considered variants on this type of program.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16  For more information on MFIP, see Miller, et. al. (2000).  In contrast, in the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program that was available to women who did not participate in MFIP, an additional dollar of 
earnings resulted in a dollar of benefit loss for most women. 
17 For more information on SSP, see Michalopoulos, et. al. (2000). 
18 A key difference between MFIP and SSP is that those assigned to the MFIP “treatment” had to participate in 
that program and were subject to sanctions if they did not participate in mandatory job search.  Being assigned to 
the SSP “treatment” meant having the choice between accepting SSP or staying in the traditional welfare 
program.  (If they voluntarily entered SPP they were not eligible for traditional welfare for the next three years.)  
Hence, the SPP results test the incentive effects of a large subsidy to work and whether women will voluntarily 
accept a 30-hour-per-week mandate in exchange for greater benefits.   The treatment results in SSP include all 
women given this choice, that is, both those who entered SSP and those who did not respond to the incentive. 
19 For both SSP and MFIP these are the numbers for long-term welfare recipients who entered the experimental 
program.  The results are somewhat lower for more recent applicants, and there are no gains for two-parent 
families in MFIP.  See Blank (forthcoming) for more information on these benefit/cost numbers.   19
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the U.S. pays nothing to non-workers, but provides 
substantial supplements to the earnings of low-wage workers in low-income families.  The 
result, documented in a growing number of studies, is greater labor supply among single 
mothers.
20   
  In short, generous transfers need not mean labor supply reductions.  When combined 
with strong work requirements, it is possible that transfer programs can provide additional 
income to low-income families at the same time as they increase labor supply and earnings.  
This is a very different result than occurs in traditional cash welfare programs, which pay the 
largest amount to nonworkers and hence encourage reductions in labor supply.  I find these 
results from the MFIP and SSP programs to be among the most interesting findings coming 
out of the U.S. welfare reform research.  They suggest how to design future policies to reduce 
efficiency costs.
21 
  An alternative example of experimental policies that combine subsidies with 
behavioral incentives comes from the unemployment insurance experiments run in a variety 
of states in the U.S. in the 1980s.
22  These experiments tried to reduce the effect of 
unemployment insurance on the length of unemployment spells by providing financial 
bonuses to individuals who found a job quickly.  While the exact nature of these experiments 
varied across states, they sought to move people into jobs more quickly and even reduce 
government spending if the bonus paid was less than the unemployment insurance that would 
have been collected in a longer unemployment spell.  While some experiments were less 
successful, the results in one state – Illinois -- were particularly strong.  The bonus payments 
                                                           
20 See Eissa and Liebman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999), or Ellwood (2000). 
21 Programs with behavioral requirements may have higher administrative costs (i.e., high C), since they require 
more services and monitoring on the part of the government agency overseeing the program. 
22 The information in this paragraph is taken from Meyer (1995).   20
resulted in shorter unemployment spells, earnings increases, a reduction in UI payments and 
only a moderate level of bonus payments.   Other experiments have sought to enforce job 
search among UI recipients, and in several locations also produced significant improvements 
in earnings and a reduction in UI payments. 
  What does this mean for policy?  I believe these policy examples suggest that we need 
to explore additional opportunities to link redistributive subsidies with behavioral mandates or 
behavioral incentives.  Such programs may take a greater degree of management skill and 
design attention than simple transfer programs, but they may also significantly reduce the 
induced income losses that are imbedded in more traditional transfer programs and thereby 
limit the leaky bucket effect produced by these programs.   
 
V.  Case 3:  Transfers as Investments 
  Both cases 1 and 2 involve transfer situations in which efficiency costs are minimized.  
The transfers themselves do not increase aggregate income in the society, but they occur 
relatively costlessly and hence they involve little loss of efficiency. 
  An alternative situation can occur if transfers subsidize the provision of services that 
function as investments; that is, if they not only increase resources in the period in which they 
occur, but they also change behavior or opportunities in such a way that they increase income 
in future periods as well.   The appeal to transfers as an “investment in the future” is 
frequently made, especially for programs aimed at poor children.   
  In fact, the possibility of investment returns may be one reason to publicly subsidize a 
particular commodity.  Traditionally, economists would argue that utility is maximized with 
greater choice, hence, cash transfers produce more benefits than in-kind transfers.  But if   21
certain types of in-kind transfers have long-term investment properties, that is a reason to 
prefer them to more general cash transfers.  This may be particularly true of school-related 
transfers or health-related transfers.
23  Let me indicate three policy areas where current 
transfers seem to produce future gains. 
  First, transfers that provide health assistance may be viewed as an investment if they 
reduce future health problems.  Public campaigns to immunize children, for instance, appear 
to have substantial long-term benefits in terms of lower future health expenditures.  (These 
could be public or private gains; in either case, they increase total income available for other 
purposes.)  For instance, the Centers for Disease Control (1999) note that “…every dollar 
spent to administer oral poliovirus vaccine saved $3.40 in direct medical costs and $2.74 in 
indirect societal costs” and “…every dollar spent to purchase measles-containing vaccine 
saved $10.30 in direct medical costs and $3.20 in indirect societal costs.”     
Prenatal and infant health care also appears to produce long-term benefits.  The 
General Accounting Office (1992) reviewed 17 evaluation studies of the Special 
Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC), a program that 
provides health and nutritional assistance to low-income mothers and their children.  On 
average, these studies suggest that every dollar invested in WIC returns an estimated $3.50 
over 18 years (discounted present value) to government and to private insurers.  Clearly, 
public expenditure programs focused on poor children’s health appear to produce substantial 
future returns. 
                                                           
23 A classic economist’s question is “if these expenditures have such large returns, why didn’t people undertake 
them on their own?”  One answer may be income or information constraints.   In some cases the decision-maker 
(the parent or caretaker) is not the same as the individual who will reap the gains (the child).  In both the health 
and education area, there are also significant positive externalities to these transfers and a substantial part of the 
gain may be received by others than those who directly receive the transfer.   22
  Second, human capital expenditures may have similar investment-type properties.  
Indeed, many transfer programs to subsidize child care or education are supported because 
they are considered investments in the future.   The evidence on the long-term gains from 
many of these programs is not as extensive as the evidence from health-related programs.  But 
in many cases, it is difficult to credibly evaluate the gains from education programs.  For 
instance, when all children are in mandatory public schooling it is hard to measure the effects 
relative to a world with no public schooling, to determine the long-term returns on public 
school dollars. 
  One preschool program in the U.S. has attracted a particularly large amount of 
research attention.  Head Start is a program designed to provide enriched pre-school training 
to low-income children in poor neighborhoods.  A cohort of head-start children from the 
1960s shows continued benefits 20 years later relative to a randomly selected control group 
(Schweinert, et. al., 1993).  A recent study by Garces, et. al. (2000) investigates Head Start’s 
effects using data from a national longitudinal sample of children.  They estimate that Head 
Start enrollment between the ages of 3 and 5 results in long-term benefits, including increased 
high school graduation and college enrollment rates.  These studies do not do actual cost-
benefit calculations, so one cannot conclude that the gains from Head Start actually exceeded 
the dollars spent.  But the magnitude and long-term nature of the measured effects suggests 
that benefit-cost ratios for the program are likely to be quite high. 
  While many job training programs aimed at disadvantaged adults or teens appear to 
not have significant long-term effects on work behavior or earnings, there are exceptions.  For 
instance, the Job Corps program in the United States, which provides special educational and 
career services for disadvantaged teens, is estimated to generate over $2 in future benefits for   23
every $1 of program expenditures (Burghardt, et. al., 2001, Table 3).  Some U.S. welfare-to-
work programs appear to create long-term earnings increases as well.   Indeed, if one believes 
that wages should grow with labor market experience, programs that mandate work should 
lead to earnings growth as a result of their additional work experience.   Gladden and Taber 
(2000) indicate that wages among less-skilled women do increase with experience.  Hotz, et. 
al. (2000) indicate that a California welfare-to-work program resulted in gains up to nine 
years later.
24 
  As discussed in Section II, welfare-to-work programs with strong financial incentives 
have also resulted in high benefit/cost ratios.  In fact, these programs may be an example of 
more efficient transfer policies that combine elements of both cases 2 and 3.  On the one hand, 
because of their behavioral mandates, they lessen the induced income losses of recipients at 
the time of the transfer.  On the other hand, because of the increase in employment that they 
generate, they may produce long-term gains in earnings if current labor market experience 
induces greater future labor force participation and higher future earnings. 
  In addition to health and human capital investments, a final (but less documented) 
example of how transfer programs might induce long-term efficiency gains could be in the 
area of attitudinal change.  It is often argued that anti-discrimination  programs – in the 
workplace or the housing market – produce substantial gains to minority populations.  Some 
of this may occur through human capital avenues, if such programs open up new training and 
job opportunities.  But some of this may occur if such programs reduce discriminatory 
behavior by the majority population over time.  That is, if enforcing anti-discrimination laws 
today reduces the taste for discrimination throughout society in the future, then there could be 
                                                           
24 Both the Job Corps and the California welfare-to-work results are based on evaluation studies involving 
randomly selected treatment and control groups and are considered highly credible.   24
beneficial income and productivity gains in the minority population that more than outweigh 
the costs of the program.  This is an area where quantitative research is more limited. 
  It is not obvious how many opportunities there are to make investment-based transfers 
which lead to larger future incomes among the poor.  While I have tried to cite a few 
examples where I think there is evidence that such an effect might be occurring, it is worth 
emphasizing that many programs are not likely to produce such long-term gains.  Going back 
to the simple conceptual framework discussed above, increases in income among the poor 
over multiple time periods must be substantial in order to actually enhance efficiency.  There 
may be induced income losses in the first period generated by behavioral changes among the 
poor (increased subsidies for children’s schooling or health may reduce parental labor supply 
or savings); in addition it is not enough that a program simply have positive benefits in order 
to argue that efficiency is enhanced.  Its benefits must outweigh all of the costs associated 
with its required level of transfers.  My guess is that fewer programs actually enhance 
efficiency than many advocates would like to claim.  The “investment” argument is used 
broadly for a wide range of child and school-related transfers; only long-term and serious 
program evaluation studies can prove which policies actually do function as investments. 
What does this mean for policy?  Even if large positive gains from transfer programs 
are not frequently available, they do appear more likely to occur in certain program areas, 
most notably those related to children’s health and education.  This argues for focusing more 
public subsidies on those services that provide ongoing future income gains and less on 
policies that simply provide one-period benefits.  It would also be useful to do more 
comparative evaluations of policies intended to generate investment returns, so that   25
policymakers can more effectively determine what specific policy design attributes are most 
likely to produce the largest long-term income gains. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  Despite extensive attention in the economics literature to the efficiency costs of 
transfer programs, there has been little attention focused on ways to minimize such costs. This 
paper has tried to investigate policy situations in which equity and efficiency need not trade 
off against each other.  My review of the evidence suggests that the equity/efficiency tradeoff 
may be low in at least three situations:  when public assistance goes to particular populations 
that have no capacity to change their behavior; when it goes to particular programs that 
combine behavioral mandates along with transfer payments; and when it subsidizes access to 
particular commodities that function as long-term investments. 
  This review also suggests that economists should potentially pay more attention to 
populations that have been less studied in the economics literature.  While many existing 
articles focus on the effects of transfer programs on able-bodied adults, a larger share of the 
poor – at least in the U.S. --  are children, elderly, or disabled.  We would benefit from a 
richer research literature that analyzes the effects of alternative transfer schemes on these 
groups.  It is possible that the general distaste for redistributive transfers that characterizes the 
opinion of many economists may be the result of a highly selected set of research studies, 
which have focused on populations where the costs of redistributive transfers are likely to be 
highest.   
  While Okun’s leaky bucket is a reality for many transfers programs, the level of 
leakage can vary substantially across programs.  Average estimates of the inefficiencies   26
induced by redistributive social policies do not adequately characterize the diversity of 
efficiency costs across individual policies.  In a number of real-world policy situations, equity 
and efficiency are not inevitably in conflict with each other.   27
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Table 1 
 
A Framework for Evaluating Efficiency/Equity Tradeoffs 
 
I.  No Redistributive Transfers 
 
Taxpayers: Yt(et) = Income in the absence of redistributive transfers 
  e t = Effort in the absence of redistributive transfers 
 
Recipients: Yr(er) = Income in the absence of redistributive transfers 
  e r = Effort in the absence of redistributive transfers 
 
Total income:  Y = Yt + Yr 
 
II.  With Redistributive Transfers 
 
Taxpayers: Y*t(e*t) = Income in the presence of redistributive transfers 
  e * t = Effort in the presence of redistributive transfers 
 
    T = Amount of tax dollars government seeks to raise 
    G = Gains to taxpayers from redistributive transfers 
  L t(e*t – et) = Induced income losses to taxpayers from redistributive taxation 
   
 Y*t(e*t)  ≈ Yt(et) – T – Lt(e*t – et)  + G 
 
Recipients: Yr(er) = Income in the presence of redistributive transfers 
  e r = Effort in the presence of redistributive transfers 
 
    B = Transfer benefits received by recipients, where B = T – C, and  
    C = Administrative costs of redistributive transfers 
  L r(e*r – er) = Induced income losses to recipients from redistributive transfers 
 
 Y*r(e*r)  ≈ Yr(er) + B – Lr(e*r – er)  
 
Total income:  Y* = Y*t + Y*r 
 
 
Redistributive transfers involve efficiency costs if  
 
  Y * t + Y*r < Yt + Yr 
or 
  T   +   L t + Lr > B + G    
 or 
  L t + Lr + C > G 
     31
Table 2 
 
Effects of Two Financial Incentive Programs Tested Using Random 
Assignment 
(Shown is the difference in outcomes between experimentals and controls  















Employment (%)  7.2***  11.5*** 
Annual Earnings ($)  649***  571* 
Annual Cash Transfers ($)  800***  614*** 
Annual Income ($)  1449***  1185*** 
Poverty (%)  -9.4***  -12.4*** 
    
Estimated income gains per 
 recipient for each dollar  
 of transfers 
1.95 2.48 
***Significant at 1 percent level. 
*  Significant at 10 percent level. 
 
Sources: Employment, earnings, cash transfers, and annual income for both programs come 
from Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001, Appendix Tables C.2 and C.3).  The MFIP program 
included a variety of components.  Reported here are the results for the full program, that is, 
the program that included financial incentives with a mandatory work program.  
 
Poverty data for MFIP comes from Miller et al (2000, Table 4.5).  Poverty data for SSP 
comes from Michalopoulos et al (2000, Table ES.2).   
 
Income gains per recipient for each dollar of transfers is shown for long-term welfare 
recipients in SSP and MFIP.   The equivalent ratios among recent single-parent applicants in 
MFIP is 0.97, and among two-parent applicants is 0.40.  These benefit/cost ratios are found in 
Blank (forthcoming, Table 8) and are explained in more detail there. 
 
  